Yardstick comparisons could provide tools for creating incentives within water utilities, information on outcomes for holding decision-makers accountable, and rankings that could give citizens realistic indicators of relative performance. Performance standards regarding service quality and reliability have cost and tariff implications because they involve resources. To attain balance in water sector's performance, bearing in mind the public interest, the use of performance assessment systems may become relevant to improve efficiency, mainly when utilities have public ownership. Regulators have employed partial incentive schemes to promote cost saving, investment efficiency, and service quality. Without information on historical trends, current baselines and realistic targets, conflicts over reforms to improve sector performance can weaken systems that are already fragile, particularly those in developing countries. It is a valuable resource for decision-makers, analysts, and policy-makers and can be used in capacity-building programs both in-house and in universities around the world. There are many other deserving claimants for public funds, so infrastructure performance needs to match promised outcomes, which donors and development partners can use to mobilize further resources.
The incentives would also be directed at meeting goals for levels of output delivered to local constituencies. To help managers gain the skills required to develop simple business plans, the appropriate Ministry or regulator could organize workshops that include presentations by managers of high-performing comparable utilities in that or neighboring nations. It underlines disparities in basing performance conclusions on partial performance indicators on one hand and aggregate analysis using modern benchmarking toolkits on the other. It underlines disparities in basing performance conclusions on partial performance indicators on one hand and aggregate analysis using modern benchmarking toolkits on the other. Documenting good performance raises additional problems, some of which can be mitigated by having basic data collection procedures embedded in operating systems. In order to examine the aforementioned relationship and further reveal the key policy messages that are derived by this analysis, parametric and non-parametric group comparisons are employed.
Utility Benchmarking and Regulation in Developing Countries examines performance monitoring and regulation as a prominent efficiency enhancement tool and clarifies many of the unknowns regarding the design and approach surrounding the area of utility management. Winners get lots of attention, and those falling behind will be motivated to try harder next time. Establishing Incentives and Appropriate Rewards Incentives can be internal to the firm: for example, offering a staff bonus pool for meeting targets or set by an external group providing oversight such as a government ministry or a development partner. In developed and developing countries, the telecommunications, energy, and water sectors have been re-structured frequently liberalized and reformed over the past two decades. It receives a similar proportional adjustment for achieving line losses lower than the loss target. The principles apply to all sectors with significant state oversight.
When targets are met, the successes need to be celebrated and publicized. Customer service Billing and revenue collection Debt management Capital procurement Sewage treatment plants Renovation of sewers Maintenance Laboratories Research and development Information systems Energy management Asset management. On a worldwide basis, due to significant market failures in the water sector, there is a requirement to promote regulation. For example, managers could reduce maintenance expenditures, cut back on staff capacity building, or halt investments in information technology that would reduce future operating costs. This is an excellent handbook for utility monitors or regulators whose primary duty is to oversee performance management.
Local leaders are likely to be the ones performing managerial functions, though these activities are closely linked to the informal arrangements characterizing small organizations. Table of Contents General Introduction; Performance Development Planning; Modes of Performance Monitoring; Exploring use of Provocative Techniques; Performance Monitoring through High Incentive Plans; Customer Relations Monitoring and Regulation; Pro-Poor Oriented Performance Monitoring; Limitations with Partial Performance Indicators: An Empirical Example. In both cases, profit change is decomposed into various factors such as quantity and price effect, technical change, efficiency change, resource mix, product mix, and scale effect. This paper describes a monitoring approach used by the National Water and Sewerage Corporation, Uganda, one that incorporates both process and metrics benchmarking. In addition, the number of connections has gone up by more than 90 percent, while water service coverage has increased from 48 to 63 percent. Usually, fairly small cash flows are involved, so a bonus that goes to a local manager who is also usually a neighbor may not be acceptable to other members of the community. However, this article highlights useful ingredients, including proper contract framework design, competition for managerial responsibility, effective business planning, performance monitoring and the use of managerial incentives.
Affordability and public acceptability: The other key pricing objective involves citizens being able to understand and pay their bills. The plans serve as guideposts for the future. The inclusion of a governance dimension, with both corporate and sectoral features, in such a context can be vital to all stakeholders. This paper aims at exploring the relationship between the Operating Cost Coverage Index and customer complaints about water and wastewater services for 1898 water utilities in 11 countries, i. It informs about the potential of saving inputs keeping the production of outputs.
From a policy perspective, results of this study illustrate the difficulties of performing benchmarking at national level. The paper concludes that these forms of benchmarking complement each other as long as there is an adequate balance so that process benchmarking does not fall prey to command and control, thereby interfering in the operator's business. Performance indicators for water utilities in Central America do not give much reason for celebration. Some government agencies, such as defence facilities or hospitals, may not pay their bills, arguing that the money all comes from the same source and that their budgets are limited. Utility Benchmarking and Regulation in Developing Countries examines performance monitoring and regulation as a prominent efficiency enhancement tool and clarifies many of the unknowns regarding the design and approach surrounding the area of utility management. There is no simple way to balance the related objectives of financial sustainability, efficient cost management, and affordability. Such activities are not a form of micro-management, because they do not take away managerial accountability for local utility performance; rather, they serve as opportunities for capacity building at the utility.
Once that stage has been reached, political leaders can set their sights on a time of transition, where institutions are in place to support dialogues among stakeholders and political parties — even if there is a lack of constructive cooperation and consensus required for long term decision making by operators. The data used are the most recent available per country through the International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities 2013-2016. Data are sparse, suggesting a lack of transparency and public awareness regarding relative performance in the region. Benchmarking is a tool that is widely used in various countries and sectors to provide both utility managers and regulatory authorities with information and incentives Stapenhurst, 2009. Purpose — This is a benchmarking study and the purpose of this paper is to investigate if there is any association between operational efficiency in the integrated water management industry in Italy and the typology of service providers, and as a consequence, the nature of concession contract. It is a valuable resource for decision-makers, analysts, and policy-makers and can be used in capacity-building programs both in-house and in universities around the world. .